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The high concentration of ownership has remained the key feature of Russian companies, 
including publicly traded companies. Even at the peak of the romance with Western portfolio 
investors, the controlling shareholders of Russian listed companies put the full control at the 
top of their priorities. In the 2000s, the Russian listed companies’ controlling shareholders 
sought gradual accommodation with minority shareholders and a gradual acceptance of 
Western corporate governance practices and thus espoused market capitalization as an 
important strategic goal. This was reversed in the 2010s as the rapidly tightening grip of the 
state on private business and mounting restrictions on Western investment in the Russian 
economy took hold. It has also reduced a market demand for Western best corporate gov-
ernance practices on the part of Russian controlling shareholders. After 2014, most control-
ling shareholders of Russian listed companies have switched to the strategy of acting as 
junior partners of the state. This switch has largely diminished their market orientation and 
the demand for Western-style corporate governance. The future of the large Russian listed 
companies fully depends on the relations of their majority owners with the Russian state and 
thus remains uncertain.
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intRoduction
This article analyzes the ownership policy, 
ownership structure and key decisions of 
controlling shareholders of Russian non-
state listed companies. This analysis is made 
in the context of the evolving role and in-
terests of the Russian state and its impact 
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on the controlling shareholders’ conduct. 
The high concentration of ownership, as 
experts point out, is the most important 
singular point for understanding the post-
privatization behavior of Russian compa-
nies from the beginning up to end of 2010s 
[Sprenger, 2002; Guriev, Rachinsky, 2004; 
Corporate Governance in Russia..., 2004; 
Entov et al., 2009]. It is stressed that the 
risk of expropriation of minority sharehold-
ers by controlling shareholders represents 
the main risk for the newly-emerged Rus-
sian  public companies. Improvement of le-
gal regulation and law enforcement by the 
state were seen as a key to solving this 
problem. In mid 2000s, few experts point-
ed to the threat of the expropriation of con-
trolling shareholders of both private and 
listed companies by the Russian state as 
a  key problem [Lazareva, Rachinsky, Ste-
pa nov, 2007]. Yet, since late 2000s, the 
ownership structure strategy pursued by 
controlling shareholders of Russian listed 
companies, the evolution of the Russian 
state’s policy towards big private business 
and outside investors, both domestic and 
foreign, as well as the drivers behind this 
policy have dropped from the focus of Rus-
sian scholarly and business analysis. Those 
few scholars who recently referred to the 
ownership structure of the Russian listed 
companies simply suggested that it poses 
threats to minority shareholders and dimin-
ishes their attractiveness for investors [Zai-
nullin et al., 2018].
The bulk of literature on Russian listed 
companies as corporate entities has been 
focused on mapping formal aspects of their 
corporate governance practices (board and 
board committees’ composition, number and 
criteria of independent directors, board 
evaluation, etc.) from the point of their 
consistency or inconsistency with the West-
ern corporate governance best practices and 
the Corporate Governance Code by the Bank 
of Russia [National Report on Corporate 
Governance, 2014; 2015; 2017; 2018; Fi la-
tov, Dzhuraev, 2014; Assessment of Cor po-
rate Governance..., 2017; Russian Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2014; Shev chuk, 2013; 
Modern Corporate Governance..., 2017]. This 
mainstream approach was set by the state 
regulator (the Bank of Russia) and is clear-
ly reflected in its surveys of corporate gov-
ernance practices [Bank of Russia, 2017a; 
2017b; 2018]. This approach is based on the 
implicit assumption that the fundamental 
interest of controlling shareholders is to 
move toward the model of Western corpora-
tion (i.e. dispersed ownership) and the goal 
of higher market capitalization should be 
their key business priority. This implies 
that  the domestic business environment in 
Russia, despite its serious defects, has been 
evolving towards the one in which Western 
companies operate, and that the Russian 
state has been interested in large number 
of foreign portfolio investors to come mak-
ing ownership of Russian companies much 
more dispersed.
However this approach dismisses evi-
dence of the reverse trend in the Russian 
politics and economy in the 2010s. In face 
of the expanding role of the state in the 
Russian economy in 2010s, experts refo-
cused from analyzing companies’ private 
ownership and the related corporate gover-
nance issues to analyzing the expansion of 
the state ownership in terms of the post-
privatization “failures of the market” and 
the ways of improving governance prac-
tices in state-owned companies [Radygin, 
Simachev, Entov, 2015; Abramov, Radygin, 
Chernova, 2016; Abramov et al., 2017]. 
Despite being extremely important, the re-
lations between Russia and the West and 
the fate of non-state listed companies in 
the new economic landscape have not been 
addressed in the prior studies. In previ-
ous works we have addressed the ownership 
structure policy pursued by controlling 
shareholders of Russian listed companies 
and their basic business orientation in the 
context of the evolving role and interests 
of the Russian state and its vision of the 
global politics and economy [Belikov, 2019a; 
2019b]. In this paper we intend to contin-
ue this approach.
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This paper seeks to:
•	 understand the ownership structure of 
Russian listed companies and thus their 
nature;
•	 analyze the conduct of their controlling 
shareholders;
•	 include the role of the state and its im-
pact on the conduct of the controlling 
shareholders into the analysis;
•	 understand the evolution of the state 
policy towards the private business since 
2000s;
•	 understand the evolving approach to-
wards corporate governance by control-
ling shareholders of Russian listed com-
panies.
Specifically, in this research we analyze 
the ownership structure of Russian listed 
companies as well as the conduct of their 
controlling shareholders in the context of 
the expanding role of the state and its evolv-
ing vision of the global politics, which shape 
the domestic environment for Russian busi-
ness. Although the analysis is focused en-
tirely on Russian companies, it is also rel-
evant to many other companies from emerg-
ing market countries. The conclusions of 
our paper are useful for investors in stocks 
of Russian companies.
oVeRVieW  
oF oWneRship stRuctuRe
In 2012–2018, the total number of Russian 
companies listed at domestic and foreign 
stock exchanges varied from 135 to 85, 
exhibiting a definite downward trend1. The 
Deloitte survey of ownership structures 
and corporate governance practices of list-
ed Russian companies in 2012 numbered 
135 companies [Corporate Governance Struc-
tures..., 2012] and the survey of 2015 num-
bered 120 companies [Corporate Governance 
Structures..., 2015].
1 This figure includes companies listed at Mos-
cow stock exchange as well as at foreign stock ex-
changes (with exception of AIM).
While 73% of companies, included into 
the Deloitte survey of 2015, had majority 
shareholder owning more than 50% of vot-
ing shares2, 95% of companies in the sam-
ple had at least one block holding with 25% 
of shares. Only four companies in the sam-
ple reportedly had two or more block hold-
ers, owning between 25 and 50%. The aver-
age free float in the sample, according to 
official data, was 25%. Experts pointed out 
that, as compared with the survey of 2012, 
concentration of ownership grew up. Ac-
cording to the survey by S&P of 2006, the 
ownership structure of 70 largest Russian 
listed companies looked like the following: 
53/59 companies had majority shareholder 
owning more than 50% of shares, 10/16 com-
panies had had at least one block holding 
with 25% of shares and the rest declared 
to have dispersed ownership structure [En-
tov et al., 2009]. So, in 2000s—2010s, the 
ownership structure of Russian listed com-
panies remained steadily highly concen-
trated.
There is a small number of Russian list-
ed companies in which the major sharehold-
er, who exercises operative control, report-
edly owns less than 50% of shares. For in-
stance, according to official data of 2018, 
the largest shareholder of Phosagro owned 
43.5%. The largest shareholder of OVK list-
ed company, Otrkytie pension fund, accord-
ing to official data of 2018, owned 19.8% 
in the company. LUKOIL has provided a uni-
que for the Russian context history of more 
than 25 years of close business partnership 
between “senior” shareholder (V. Alekpe-
rov  — 27% of shares) and “junior” share-
holder (L. Fedun — 10%). Yet, while analyz-
ing ownership structure of Russian compa-
nies, both listed and non-listed, one should 
keep in mind the following factors.
•	 The official data on ownership structure 
do not always provide a completely true 
story of real beneficial ownership. Be-
neficial controlling shareholder, while 
2 Here and further on, number of shares will 
mean voting shares.
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reporting to own less than 50%, can have 
higher actual level of control through 
control of legal entity which owns a sig-
nificant stake in the listed company, but 
officially is not affiliated with this major 
shareholder. Another tool used to dis-
guise actual beneficial control is a private, 
publicly undisclosed, agreement of the 
major shareholder of a Russian listed 
company with an owner of a significant 
stake in this listed company on taking 
concerted decisions on all major manage-
ment and governance issues. The owner 
of that significant stake, in most cases, 
has been in long business relationship 
with the major shareholder, usually as 
his junior partner.
•	 The lasting partnership between signifi-
cant shareholders of a similar or differ-
ent weight category is a very rare phe-
nomenon in Russia.
•	 Most widespread practice in Russian 
companies, both listed and non-listed, is 
a  strong desire of major shareholder to 
have full control (i. e. over 50% of shares).
OECD experts provided the following ex-
planation for the Russian corporate land-
scape: “The ability of large businesses to 
protect their property rights against both 
the private sector and government interven-
tion resided precisely in their size, giving 
them an advantage that smaller competitors 
did not have. Likewise, the size of these 
conglomerates allowed them to finance them-
selves more easily and redistribute the cash 
flows intragroup in the face of an underde-
veloped external capital market. Internal 
mobility of the workforce was also a substi-
tute for an inefficient labor market” [Ko-
sty le va, Lehuedé, 2012, p. 18].
The key factors, which have contributed 
to cementing high concentration of owner-
ship of Russian companies, both listed and 
non-listed, over the period after 2012, in 
our view, are high risks of assets expro-
priation by raiders with connections in law 
enforcement bodies and judicial system, 
weak judicial protection of property rights, 
authoritarian social and business culture 
and a low level of trust in relations among 
business partners. As a result, real free float 
of Russian listed companies, with very few 
exceptions, has not exceeded 25% and for 
most of them it has been much beyond that 
level.
The history of IPOs and SPOs of Russian 
companies is spectacular in terms of under-
standing the business credo of Russian con-
trolling shareholders. In 2006–2007 which 
was the peak of Russian firms' romance with 
Western investors, stock price multipliers 
at IPOs of Russian companies reached 16–
17 or even 18. Yet, even at that fabulous 
time controlling shareholders of Russian 
companies never allowed amounts of stocks, 
meaningful in terms of governance, to slip 
from their hands. Russian controlling share-
holders used the following ways to retain 
control at IPOs and SPOs:
•	 to buy large amounts of newly-issued 
stocks (up to 50% or even more) on their 
behalf;
•	 to buy large amounts of newly-issued 
stocks through entities controlled by the 
controlling shareholders which were de-
clared to be unaffiliated with the latter;
•	 to arrange purchases of significant 
amounts of newly-issued stocks by close 
business partners of controlling share-
holders with the former taking publicly 
undisclosed commitments to act on gov-
ernance issues in concert with controlling 
shareholders.
Various sources provide somewhat differ-
ent figures on Russian IPOs. Yet, the figures 
below, in our view, provide a reasonably 
reliable aggregate picture of capital attrac-
tion by Russian companies through public 
share offerings (Table 1).
The global financial crisis of 2008 marked 
a serious drop in the number of Russian 
IPOs and SPOs. Although, this started to 
recover in 2010, the year 2014 became the 
really dramatic turning point. It is not that 
the total number of public offerings dropped 
in 2014 dramatically far beyond the level 
of 2008. It tolled the beginning of the exo-
dus of many large Russian companies from 
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Western stock exchanges through voluntary 
delisting. Among them were such flagships 
of Russian industries as Uralkali, Megafon, 
NordGold, Polyus, Cherkizovo Group, PIK, 
Chelyabinsk Zinc Plant. That exodus was a 
sharp contrast to the growth of global IPO 
market in 2014–2017 which covered com-
panies from leading emerging markets (see 
[Baker & MacKenzie, 2017]). It is remark-
able that since 2014 Russia has been out of 
the radar of the Global IPO trends quar-
terly issued by EY, a very influential ana-
lytical source on IPOs.
A number of Russian companies which 
delisted their stocks from the major foreign 
stock exchanges, listed their stocks at the 
Moscow exchange (MOEX). Since 2014, Rus-
sian companies have refocused their activ-
ity in public offerings on the MOEX, with 
few exceptions. Yet, the total number of 
Russian public companies has continued to 
decline after 2012. According to the over-
view by the Bank of Russia, the number of 
domestically listed companies was 84 in 2015 
[Bank of Russia, 2017] and 65 in 2018 [Bank 
of Russia, 2019].
Our analysis of policies pursued by the 
Russian companies at MOEX has revealed 
that very often these are much different 
from a “classic” business strategy pursued 
by Western corporations and by issuers from 
emerging markets, which is aimed at raising 
stock market capitalization through increas-
ing a share in its ownership structure owned 
by leading global institutional investors and 
increasing a free float of their stocks. To 
prove that we provide two following exam-
ples from the history of Russian IPOs and 
SPOs at MOEX after 2014.
•	 In November 2016, RussNeft company 
made an IPO of 20% of its stocks. Ac-
cording to the official report on the re-
sults of the placement, the share of the 
controlling shareholder, M. Gutseriev, 
dropped down to 47%, the demand for 
shares exceeded the offer by 30%, the 
major buyers were “physical persons” and 
10% of shared were bought by “banks, 
investment funds, hedge funds and for-
eign investors”. According to the com-
pany, all buyers were not affiliated with 
the it or with the controlling sharehold-
er [Dzyadko, 2016]. However, no details 
on buyers were disclosed for the market. 
Vedomosti, the leading Russian business 
daily, gave the following comment on this 
IPO: “It is unknown which buyers ensured 
the reported high demand and the over-
subscription”. Representatives of large 
investment funds called by the daily de-
nied they took part in the IPO. “We did 
not see benefits in this placements and 
our customers did not express interest 
in it”, said one of them. Prior to the IPO, 
a senior investment fund manager admit-
ted that this IPO would be a “backstage” 
one and a part of securities offered would 
be bought by pension funds which make 
Table 1
ipos и spos of Russian companies  
at Russian and foreign exchanges  
(main markets) (2001–2018)
Year Russian  exchanges
Foreign  
exchanges total
2018 0 0 0
2017 8 5 13
2016 5 2 7
2015 6 2 8
2014 0 2 2
2013 9 7 16
2012 2 8 10
2011 12 8 20
2010 14 4 18
2009 8 5 13
2008 8 6 14
2007 17 17 34
2006 6 12 18
2005 3 6 9
2004 4 1 5
2003 0 1 1
2002 1 2 3
2001 0 0 0
S o u r c e: An overview of Russian IPOs. URL: 
http://www.preqveca.ru/placements/ (accessed: 15.12. 
2019).
432 I. Belikov, A. Dementieva
РЖМ 17 (4): 427–444 (2019)
part of Samafar financial group con-
trolled by M. Gutseriev’s family. Yet, Sa-
mafar denied it had taken part in IPO 
[Starinskaya, Mesroelyan, 2016]. Market 
analysts cast doubts on the announc-
ed placement price. A. Kalachev, analyst 
of Finam financial company, pointed out 
that Russneft market capitalization/
EBITDA ratio after the IPO was as high 
as 6.5, while for other listed Russian oil 
companies, well-entrenched in the indus-
try, which had proven their financial 
stability and ensured good dividend flow, 
it was between 4.5 and 5.5 at that time. 
The net debt/EBITDA ratio for these 
oil  companies in 2015 was much lower 
(TATNEFT — 0.04; RossNeft — 1.36) 
than for Russneft (4.5). So, if buyers 
bought RussNneft stocks at the official-
ly announced price at the IPO, they got 
no discount for the newcomer status of 
the company but paid a significant pre-
mium [Easy Money..., 2016]. It could 
have been that all buyers overpaid for 
RussNneft stocks due to miscalculations. 
But in our view, there is an explanation 
for this which looks more sound: high 
price was paid by buyers who were af-
filiated with RussNneft’s controlling 
shareholder. This explanation makes the 
real ownership structure of RussNneft 
after the IPO look quite different from 
what was officially announced.
•	 In December 2015, Evroplan, financial 
leasing company, announced to have made 
a very successful IPO selling 25% of its 
stocks. According to the company, the 
demand exceeded the offer by 40% and 
the securities were sold at the top of the 
offering price level. The company an-
nounced that as the result of the IPO 
the share of the controlling shareholder, 
M. Shyshkhanov, dropped from 100 to 
75%. However, this triumphant report-
ing was a sharp contrast with massive 
negative comments by business media and 
experts. Vedomosti described this IPO as 
“yet another deal when the owner of pen-
sion funds financed with their money his 
other business. M. Shyshkhanov sold 25% 
of Evroplan, owned by him to the pension 
funds of Bin group controlled by him”. 
Analysts of Sberbank CIF investment 
bank were equally critical of the IPO: 
“The placement was made with a minimal 
public disclosure... The buyers have re-
mained unknown... Such investment does 
not fit into customers’ interests and is 
an example of a conflict of interest of 
customers and owners of pension funds”. 
They also pointed out that institutional 
investors did not include Evroplan stocks 
in their portfolios and did not show in-
terest in them [Petrova, Biyanova, 2016]. 
In January 2016, Evroplan reported that 
the stake owned by M. Shyshkahnov dropp-
ed  down to 51.1% as the result of the 
sale of 25% to the same buyers.
At large, the history of IPOs and SPOs 
by Russian companies shows that the over-
riding priority of their controlling share-
holders has been to retain their full control 
over these companies. In our view, this is 
fundamental for understanding the Russian 
IPOs and SPOs in the foreseeable future.
Major Russian companies, which made 
voluntary delisting from both, Western and 
Russian stock exchanges, explain these 
moves by their plans to make successful 
comebacks in a near future which would 
ensure quick increase of their market capi-
talization. But stagnant Russian economy, 
sustained political tension between Russia 
and the West and controversial history of 
many Russian IPOs make these declarations 
very questionable, to put it mildly. Analysts 
do not take these declarations at face value 
but consider them as a veil for a new cor-
porate strategy of these companies for the 
foreseeable future.
From our point of view, this is a strat-
egy which does not provide for the reducing 
stakes of controlling shareholders, does not 
diminish their grip on these companies and 
does not include the prospect of a transit 
of these shareholders from their present 
status to the status of financial investors. 
Under this strategy, market capitalization 
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is not viewed as a key economic objective. 
At the core of this strategy is a close coop-
eration with the Russian state as its junior 
partner and obtaining advantages from it, 
such as large state contracts, loans from 
state banks at beyond-market rates, legal 
restrictions on activities of foreign com-
petitors on Russian market, support by the 
state in export, etc. This strategy also in-
cludes utmost priority to close cooperation 
with large state-owned companies, state-
owned banks, private companies with strong 
connections at the top political level and 
some Western companies which obtained 
a most favored status from the Russian po-
litical leadership3.
3 There are some examples. In spring 2019, me-
dia reported that A. Mordashov, a major Russian 
tycoon owning the controlling stakes in two large 
listed companies, Severstal and Lenta, obtained 
a significant stake in Rostelecom, large state-owned 
listed company. He did that in alliance with VTB, 
one of the two largest state-owned banks, and 
Rossiya Bank, which is reputed to have very strong 
personal connections at the very top of the Russian 
state hierarchy. These three new shareholders paid 
their stakes in Rostelecom by shares of Tele 2, the 
fourth largest mobile telecom company, jointly 
owned by them [Korzhova, Kodachigov, 2019]. In 
February 2019, the CEO of Megafon (recently del-
isted from the LSE) said that the new strategy of 
the company, after delisting, provides for becoming 
the main partner of the state in transforming 
Russian cities into “smart ones” and in “digitaliza-
tion” of Russian regions, including management 
of urban infrastructure (procurement and technical 
installation of “smart” equipment, urban lighting, 
road traffic regulation, communal services manage-
ment, security, tele-health services, etc.). After 
the adoption of the Yarovaya law, in 2016, which 
mandated all Russian telecom companies to install 
audio surveillance equipment (the total costs are 
estimated at 100–120 bln rub.), by 2019, Tsy ta del 
company, affiliated with A. Usmanov, the control-
ling shareholder of Megafon, took up to 80% of 
the surveillance equipment market [Ko lo my chen ko, 
2019]. Both Russian listed largest Internet com-
panies, Mail.ru (LSE) and Yandex (NASDAQ), have 
signed strategic cooperation agreements with Sber-
bank, a top-2 largest bank, owned by the state. 
Cooperation provides for a gradual integration of 
many key assets owned by the bank and these com-
conditional oWneRship
The important factor which determines bu-
siness conduct of controlling shareholders 
of major Russian listed companies is restric-
tions imposed by the Russian state on their 
right to sell large stakes, let alone control 
stakes, to foreign investors. The Russian 
state considers these companies as national 
strategic assets over which it has ultimate 
control for national security reasons. To 
regulate sales of stakes in companies (both 
listed and non-listed) which are considered 
strategic entities the Government Com mis-
sion on Foreign Investment was set up in 
2008. Under the new regulation, all trans-
actions by foreign investors who gain direct 
or indirect control over more than 25% of 
the total voting shares of any “business en-
tities of strategic importance for national 
defense and state security” or acquire the 
right to directly or indirectly control more 
that 5% of the total voting shares of the 
“business entities of strategic importance 
for national defense and state security” in-
volved in exploration and development and 
production of natural resources in the sub-
surface areas, must be preliminary approved 
by the government commission. Our analy-
sis of the commission’s proceedings has re-
vealed a very broad definition of a “strate-
gic company” used by the Commission. It 
acted on applications by foreign investors 
to acquire stakes not only in strategic major 
companies but in companies of mass media, 
fishing, pharmaceuticals and with annual 
sales in the range from 200 mln rub. (about 
$3.3 mln) to 4–5 bln rub. (about $63–
80 mln).
According to the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service (FAS), in 2008–2018, the Com mis-
sion received 516 stock acquisition applica-
tions from foreign investors. It reviewed 
229 applications and rejected 13 of them 
(less than 5% of applications considered). 
panies. Russian media regularly reports, that Sber-
bank is assigned by the state with gradually taking 
over control over both companies.
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No explanation has ever been provided on 
why the other 287 applications have not 
been reviewed. In all likelihood, these ap-
plications have been tacitly withdrawn by 
applicants who saw very little chance to 
succeed. Reportedly, an unknown number 
of prospective applicants decided not to sub-
mit their applications at all for fear of being 
rejected. The example below clearly reveals 
problems faced by controlling shareholders 
of Russian companies seeking to sell control-
ling stakes to foreign investors.
In 2015, major shareholders of Eurasia 
Drilling Company (EDC)4, which then con-
trolled 20–22% of the Russian oil drilling 
market, reached an agreement with Schlum-
ber ger on stage-by stage selling (within 
3 years) to it of 100% of EDC stocks. Fol-
lowing the agreement, EDC got its shares 
delisted from the LSE. For this transaction 
the EDC major shareholders raised loans 
from banks. Yet, after the transaction en-
tered into effect and the shares were bought 
out by major shareholders after delisting, 
the latter were unofficially informed about 
negative reaction of the Russian government 
to the transaction. The reason was that 
Schlumberger is “a US company” and will 
have to bind to economic sanctions which 
have been already taken or can be taken by 
US government against Russia. Years of ne-
gotiations between the EDC owners and the 
Russian government on the destiny of the 
deal have followed. Initially, the Russian 
government insisted on gaining for free 
the  golden share in the company [Melni-
kov,  Khvostik, 2015]. In further negotia-
tions, the Russian government insisted that 
Schlum ber ger must take obligation that only 
a Russian citizen can be appointed the CEO 
of EDC and to sell all EDC shares to a Rus-
sian company designated by the Rus sian 
government in case new Western economic 
sanctions are taken against Russia. Later, 
this was added by the demand to split the 
controlling stake in EDC between Schlum-
4 The company was registered at BVI but had 
all its assets in Russia.
ber ger and the consortium led by the state-
owned Russian Fund for Direct In vest ment 
(RFDI) including state-owned investment 
funds from China and the UAE. Subsequently 
RFDI changed its stand several times and 
in June 2019 it asked the FAS to cancel its 
application for a permit to acquire 30% of 
EDC by the consortium led by it. This has 
made the fate of the transaction complete-
ly uncertain.
The fundamental fact to take into account 
is that after 1917 Russia has lost tradition 
to bequeath large industrial assets through 
inheritance and there are no signs of prep-
aration for such handover as a massive busi-
ness phenomenon in modern Russia.
S. Sviridov, head of analytical department 
of A1 investment company5, predicts a sharp 
escalation of conflicts over corporate assets 
control in Russia. In his view, among the 
drivers of this escalation will be the forth-
coming withdrawal of founders of companies 
due to their advanced age. Many heirs, in 
his view, will not be as tough as their fathers 
who founded the corporations and this will 
provoke raiders’ attacks on them to wrest 
corporate control out of their hands [Svi ri-
dov, 2018]. Experts point out that almost 
all founders of major Russian companies view 
their companies’ sales as the best strategy 
[Succession in Russian Business..., 2014].
It is very likely that the Russian state 
will not allow the controlling shareholders 
of major Russian companies to sell control 
to foreign investors. It is good reason to 
expect that it will impose conditions of such 
transactions which most foreign investors 
will find unacceptable.
Then, what are prospects for controlling 
stakes of major Russian companies to be 
sold at a fair market price at the domestic 
market and who would be able to buy them?
According to the assessment made by 
Moody’s Investors Service in October 2018, 
5 A1 is a Russian company known for its very 
tough treatment of business partners. Its services 
have been often used as an “ultima ratio” by parties 
involved in corporate conflicts.
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the Russian banking system is the weakest 
in the BRICS group of countries in terms 
of asset quality, liquidity and profitability 
[Among BRICS nations..., 2018]. So, it is 
very unlikely that Russian banks will be 
able to finance buyouts of controlling stakes 
of major Russian companies at more or less 
fair market prices. Even largest Russian 
state-owned banks, VTB and Sberbank, are 
very unlikely to finance buyouts of control-
ling stakes of 15–25 major Russian compa-
nies at a fair market price within 3–4 year 
period by buyers who will obtain political 
blessing from the Kremlin. With the share 
of the state in the Russian banking system 
reached 70% in 2018 and the forecast to 
reach 85% in the next 3–5 years [Falyakhov, 
2018], non-state Russian banks are very 
unlikely to play any significant role in this 
process6. So, it is more likely that the con-
trolling stakes of these companies will be 
sold at very large discounts to designated 
buyers, similarly to the privatization of the 
1990s.
Lasting political tension between Russia 
and the West undercuts prospects for Rus-
sian banks to borrow much funding from 
the West and makes unacceptable for Rus-
sian political leadership the schemes in 
which major stakes of leading Russian com-
panies are used as collateral to Western 
banks.
Despite high-pitched political rhetoric of 
Russo-Chinese friendship, Chinese banks 
have been very cautious in their activities 
in Russia. Providing large-scale financing 
by them will raise similar national security 
concerns in the Russian political establish-
ment as in the case of Western banks7. 
Therefore, the controlling shareholders of 
6 In our view, it is very revealing that the ac-
quisition of the relatively limited stake (11.8%) of 
Magnit, a major Russian retailer, by Marathon 
Group, investment company with reportedly very 
strong political connections, was funded by VTB 
and structured as a repo transaction [Demidova, 
Parfentieva, 2018]. 
7 It is remarkable that a failed attempt to sell 
a large stake (about 15%) of RossNeft, in 2017–
major Russian companies face the prospect 
of having no choice but to sell their control 
stakes at a very discounted price to new 
owners designated by the Kremlin, or to 
state-owned banks or companies. Domestic 
political and economic situation in Russia, 
the steady expansion of the state’s control 
over all areas, coupled with a sustained po-
litical tension in relations between Russia 
and the West, make the future of major Rus-
sian non-state companies very uncertain. In 
our view, this is the key to understand the 
conduct of controlling shareholders of these 
companies.
the Roads theY taKe
In terms of their conduct, Russian owners 
of large industrial and financial assets (in-
cluding controlling shareholders of major 
listed companies) can be divided in two 
groups.
The first group has opted for emigration 
from Russia. According to Knight Frank, 
in 2000–2013, 14 000 of individuals with 
personal fortunes counted in millions and 
billions of dollars (high net wealth individ-
uals and ultra-high net wealth individuals — 
HNWIs and UHNWIs) left Russia [Second 
Citizenship..., 2015]. A part of them has 
stopped doing business in Russia. But an-
other, more significant part, by estimates, 
has continued doing business in Russia, de-
spite no longer being Russian tax residents. 
In 2014–2016, according to Knight Frank, 
more than 6000 of Russian HNWIs and 
UHNWIs left the country. It is not clear 
how many among them are controlling share-
holders of Russian listed companies. Mass 
media has referred to 10–15 names with 
periodical confirmations and denials.
The second group is the overwhelming 
majority of public companies’ controlling 
shareholders who have stayed in Russia and 
do their business in accordance with rules 
2018, to CEFC, a large Chinese energy trader, was 
financed by VTB and not by Chinese banks.
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set by the Kremlin. For many of them the 
period of 2016–2018 was extremely suc-
cessful.
The number of Russian billionaires grew 
by 29 in 2016–2018, as Russian Forbes re-
ported in its list of richest Russians in 2018 
[200 richest businessmen, 2018]. Accord-
ing  to The Knight Frank Wealth Report, 
in 2017 the number of owners of $500 mln 
fortunes grew in Russia by 22% [The Wealth 
Re port..., 2017]. According to Cre dit Suisse, 
the number of Russians with $50 mln-plus 
fortunes in 2017 grew up by 26% to have 
reached 2620. This trend continued in 2018 
[Global Wealth Report, 2018]. In 2018, the 
total number of Russian billionaires reach-
ed 106 and this put Russia third in the 
global rating of billionaires, after US and 
China.
According to the BCG findings [BCG, 
2019], in 2010s, Russia enjoyed very high 
level of the personal financial wealth growth 
pace and its total amount reached $1.3 trl 
46% of the Russian private capital is owned 
by ultra-high net wealth individuals (with 
assets of more than $100 mln), while for 
Eastern Europe this indicator is 28% and 
the global average is 12%.
The period of 2016–2018 was the one of 
a very lackluster performance of the Russian 
economy8, with very few IPOs and SPOs, 
many of which were “technical” exercises. 
So, it is a good reason to believe that the 
above success stories were based on close 
cooperation of big Russian business with 
the state on selective favorable terms. The 
success in this cooperation requires from 
the Russian businessmen a strategy which 
is quite different from a “classic” market 
one.
The other side of the coin is that the 
Russian state has cemented its belief that 
it can order, at its full discretion, big Rus-
8 The GDP growth rate, as calculated by The 
Russian Government Analytical Center, based on 
the Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat), fa-
mous for providing too optimistic data: 2016 — 
0.6%, 2017 — 1.6%, 2018 — 2.3%.
sian business to make additional financial 
contributions, besides taxes already paid, 
to projects which the state considers as hav-
ing strategic importance.
For instance, in August 2018, A. Belo-
usov, assistant for economy to President Pu-
tin, publicly voiced the idea to make 14 larg-
est Russian companies, mostly listed ones 
(Acron, ALROSA, Evraz, NLMK, Norilsk 
Nickel, Mechel, Magnitogorsk metallurgy 
plant, Polyus Gold, Severstal, Sibur, SUEK, 
Phosagro, Uralkali, Uralchim) pay 500 bln 
rub. of “excessive profits” — either as an 
ad hoc quasi-tax, or as their “voluntary in-
vestment” — into projects selected by the 
state9.
Speaking to the Eastern economic forum, 
in September 2018, President Putin desig-
nated infrastructure of the Russian Far East 
as the objects the Russian companies, which 
use it, to invest in.
Experts, close to the Kremlin, periodi-
cally assert that expropriation of “super-
profits” of large non-state companies is a 
“tax on privatization” to legitimize the right 
of their controlling shareholders to keep on 
their assets, obtained in the dubious priva-
tization of the 1990s. Yet, same experts 
admit: “It is not possible to put the end to 
debates on legitimacy of ownership (large 
private companies. — I. B., A. D.) once and 
for ever, especially due uncertainty related 
to the post-Putin transit of power” [Simo-
nov, 2018].
the implications
The decreasing attractiveness of Russian 
listed companies for major Western insti-
tutional investors and a lasting effect of 
factors behind this trend, the tightening 
grip of the state over these companies and 
uncertainty of the fate of these companies, 
9 This news has resulted in the downfall of mar-
ket capitalization of 9 listed companies from the 
above list by 392 bln rub. at LSE, NYSE and 
MOEX.
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lead the majority of Russian controlling 
shareholders to no longer consider market 
capitalization of their companies as the pri-
mary strategic goal. Our analysis has driv-
en us to the conclusion that since 2013 the 
controlling shareholders of major Russian 
listed companies have refocused their inter-
est on dividend payments at the most ap-
propriate way to monetize their property 
rights and have embarked on the policy of 
maximizing dividend payments.
Since 2013, the Russian listed companies 
have been increasing a share of their net 
profits paid out as dividends. They have been 
changing the rules of dividend payment cal-
culations so as to make the performance 
indicators with higher values the calculation 
basis. The frequency of dividend payments 
has been growing: more companies have 
started to pay not only annual dividends but 
interim dividends, as well as special divi-
dends. This trend has expanded to all indus-
tries of Russian economy. There are large 
listed companies which have fixed the mini-
mal levels for their dividend payments at 50 
or 75% of their net cash flow and some — at 
100% of net profits or net cash flow.
Analyzing the dividend payments for 
2013, Expert weekly reported: “There is a 
growing number of equities on the Russian 
market with dividend yields exceeding 7 –8% 
and even 15%... According to calculations 
by GHP Group, the average dividend yield 
on the Russian market... reached 4.41% 
which is among the highest ones in the 
world” [Kontsevich, Obukhova, 2014].
As Vedomosti reported, “despite the eco-
nomic recession, which started last year 
(2013. — I. B., A. D.) and the decrease in 
the total profits of Russian companies in 
2014 (by 9.8%, according to Rosstat as com-
pared with 2013), many Russian listed com-
panies have preserved and even increased 
their dividend payments for the year 2014” 
[Koval, 2015]. Among the leaders in the 
amounts of dividend payments were such 
listed companies as ALROSA, M-Video, Mag-
nit, NorNickel, Severstal, FGC UES, Phos-
Agro and some others.
According to ACRA10, dividend payments 
by Russian non-financial companies for 
2016, grew up by 9% as compared with 2015 
and reached 1.5 trl rub (Fig. 1). The dividend 
payments by large Russian companies for 
2017 grew up by 16% as compared with 
201611. According to Bloomberg, the divi-
dend yield for 2017 of Russian companies 
in RTS index was 6.3%, while for Turkish 
companies this indicator was 4.8% and for 
Brazilian companies — 4.2%. The average 
dividend yield for MSCI Emerg ing Markets 
was 2.8%. ACRA experts point ed out that 
as the result of high dividends for 2017, 
the aggregate free cash flow of large Russian 
companies became negative with less funds 
used for investment [Bur mi stro va, 2018].
There was a dramatic increase in dividend 
payments by Russian companies for 2018 — 
up by 50%: for the first time in Russian 
corporate history their total amount reached 
3 trl rub (Fig. 2). According to calculations 
by National Rating Agency (NRA) expert 
K. Koukoushkin, the average dividend pay-
ments growth pace in 2013–2018 was 23%. 
According to Bloomberg, in March 2019, 
10 ACRA (Analytical Credit Rating Agency) is 
the leading Russian rating agency, accredited by 
the Bank of Russia.
11 This calculation by ACRA was based on the 
analysis of dividend payments by 227 largest non-
financial Russian companies.
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the dividend yield of Russian equities reach-
ed 5.7%, while for MSCI Emerging markets 
this indicator was 3%, for the leading Euro-
pean indices — 2.5–4%, for US indices — 
1–2.2% and for Asian indices  — 2–3.5% 
(Fig. 3). Experts specially noted “an extreme-
ly high” growth of dividend payments by 
state-owned Russian companies.
Despite some differences in amounts of 
dividend payments, all the above date clear-
ly display that after 2013, dividend pay-
ments have been growing steadily and they 
have become the main means of monetization 
for the controlling shareholders of Russian 
listed companies.
In 2012, the OECD experts assessed the 
impact of high ownership concentration of 
Russian listed companies on their corporate 
governance practices in the following way: 
“This high concentration of ownership in 
the hands of a few powerful shareholders 
presents challenges similar to those describ-
ed from Indonesia and Korea in the OECD 
peer review, rather than those faced by coun-
tries like the U.S. or the Netherlands. This 
is somehow reflected in strong de jure duties 
assigned to the board combined with a de 
facto situation in which they often do not 
play a decisive role in the governance of the 
company” [Kostyleva, Lehuede, 2012, p. 20]. 
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Since that time the problem has become more 
acute.
Deeply entrenched ownership concentra-
tion of Russian listed companies with strong 
stimuli to keep this level and diminishing 
stimuli to decrease it strengthen the belief 
of Russian controlling shareholders that 
from the point of beneficial ownership struc-
ture the right of the real governance power 
fully belongs to them and not to boards of 
directors. In face of persistent and even 
growing non-economic risks, the controlling 
shareholders of Russian listed companies 
consider endowing the boards with real pow-
ers, even to a limited extent, as an unac-
ceptable move.
In late 1990s — late 2000s, a growing 
number of listed Russian companies espoused 
some elements of the Western best corporate 
governance practices, primarily those re-
lated to composition of boards (election of 
a limited number of formally independent 
members) and their work procedures (board 
committees, regular meetings, setting up of 
internal audit functions, etc.). This process 
was driven by the then high attractiveness 
of emerging markets for Western investors 
at large and of the Russian market in par-
ticular, due to high pace of economic growth 
and high level of oil prices (Russia’s main 
export commodity). At that time, the con-
trolling shareholders of the growing number 
of Russian companies seemed to believe that 
such steps really helped to attract major 
Western portfolio investors and to drive up 
market capitalization of their companies.
Yet, by the end of 2010s, big Russian busi-
ness, including most of controlling sharehold-
ers of Russian listed companies, apparently 
lost the above belief because of mounting 
political tension between Russia and the West 
and tightening restrictions by the state upon 
sale of large stakes, let alone controlling ones, 
to Western investors. As the result, since 
2015, corporate governance practices of ma-
ny Russian listed companies in their impor-
tant components (number of independent 
directors, board procedures, transparency 
and disclosure, etc.) have stagnated or have 
turned into box ticking exercises. For the 
controlling shareholders, dividend maximiza-
tion has replaced market capitalization as the 
main way of property right monetization.
The focus on close partnership with the 
state as the core of the new strategies of 
many Russian listed companies and the 
mount ing restrictions by the state on West-
ern investment in the Russian economy have 
dramatically reduced a market demand for 
Western best corporate governance prac-
tices on the part of Russian controlling 
shareholders.
The “turn to the East”, declared by the 
Russian political leadership after 2014, in-
cludes the substitution of Western investors 
with the state and state-affiliated large in-
vestors from China and Arab countries (Sau-
di Arabia, Qatar, UAE). Some of these new 
investors acquired significant stakes (10–
15%) in some Russian listed companies. Yet, 
our analysis shows that in taking decisions 
on such acquisitions these investors are 
much more motivated by political relations 
of these countries with Russia than by pure-
ly economic interests. As shareholders of 
Russian companies, these investors rely pri-
marily on interaction of their governments 
with the Russian government and political 
guarantees from the latter as the way to 
protect their interests, rather than on cor-
porate governance practices of the target 
Russian companies. As the result, these 
investors usually make very little, if any, 
contribution to improvement of corporate 
governance practices in Russian companies.
conclusion
High concentration of ownership has become 
the DNA of Russian companies, both listed 
and private. This situation is very unlikely 
to change in the foreseeable future. The 
major risk which cements this stand of con-
trolling shareholders of these companies is 
expropriation by groups with strong con-
nections in the law enforcement bodies and 
at the top levels of the political hierarchy 
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or by the state. The controlling stake does 
not provide full guarantee against this risk 
but the stake below it makes this risk too 
high. Authoritarian social and business cul-
ture and a low level of trust in relations 
among business partners have contributed 
to high ownership concentration of Russian 
companies. There has been no indication of 
improvement on this front.
The Russian state considers big private 
business as its order-taking partner and this 
makes the state very much interested in 
preserving high concentration of ownership 
of major Russian companies. It is much 
easier for the state to deal with a limited 
number of controlling shareholders rather 
than with large number of portfolio inves-
tors, especially with politically influential 
Western institutional investors. This is the 
key to the real practices of the government 
regulation and especially enforcement of 
relationship between majority and minority 
shareholders in major Russian companies.
Till the late 2000s, most controlling share-
holders of Russian listed companies sought 
to combine high ownership control with grad-
ual accommodation with minority sharehold-
ers and acceptance of some Western corpo-
rate governance practices. Increasing market 
capitalization of these companies at that 
period due to their growing attractiveness 
for Western portfolio investors was a very 
important driver in this policy.
After 2014, in face of the policy of mount-
ing restrictions on Western investment in 
the Russian economy pursued by the gov-
ernment, most controlling shareholders of 
Russian listed companies have switched to 
the strategy of acting as junior partners 
of the state. This switch has largely dimin-
ished their market orientation and the de-
mand for Western-style corporate gover-
nance.
It is quite likely that in the first half of 
the 2020s many of the existing large non-
state Russian listed companies will come 
under direct control of the state or will be 
taken over by new controlling shareholders 
who are closely affiliated with the top ech-
elon of ruling political establishment.
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Российские публичные компании: контролирующие акционеры и их стратегия
И. В. Беликов
Российский институт директоров, Россия
А. Г. Дементьева
Факультет международного бизнеса и делового администрирования, Московский 
государственный институт международных отношений (МГИМО) МИД России, Россия
Высокая концентрация акционерной собственности выступает основной характеристикой 
российских компаний, включая публичные. Сохранение контроля — приоритетная цель 
контролирующих акционеров этих компаний. В 2000-е гг. они стремились к привлечению 
западных портфельных инвесторов, внедряли элементы западной практики корпоративного 
управления и рассматривали рост капитализации как важную часть своей стратегии. В 2010-е гг. 
этот процесс остановился в связи с резким ростом контроля государства над экономикой и 
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ограничений с его стороны на западные инвестиции. После 2014 г. большинство контроли-
рующих акционеров этих компаний сделали выбор в пользу стратегии превращения в млад-
шего партнера государства, что резко сократило их рыночную ориентацию и спрос на за-
падную практику корпоративного управления. Будущее крупных публичных компаний 
в России полностью зависит от отношений их контролирующих акционеров с государством, 
в связи с  чем является весьма неопределенным.
Ключевые слова: публичные компании, структура собственности, государство, контролиру-
ющие акционеры, IPO, монетизация прав собственности, корпоративное управление.
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